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在两阶段供应链中,市场营销也会导致需求的变动.引入营销费用与零售价格共同影响市场需求,并假设卖方决定订货批量,分别从非合作博弈和合作博弈两个角度对两阶段供应链管理问题进行分析.非合作博弈分析的是卖方或买方分别作为领导者时的Stackelberg模型;合作博弈是把卖方和买方的利润函数加权后作为目标函数,求出了帕累托最优解.结果证明,在合作博弈中存在帕累托有效解,与非合作博弈相比,合作博弈的订货批量更小,零售价格更低,市场营销费用更少.并列举案例,对模型中主要参数进行敏感性分析.
In the two-phase supply chain, marketing also leads to the change of demand.The introduction of marketing costs and retail prices together affect the market demand, and suppose that the seller decides the order quantity, respectively from the two perspectives of non-cooperative game and cooperative game on the two-stage supply chain Management problem.The non-cooperative game analysis is the Stackelberg model when the seller or the buyer respectively as the leader.Cooperative game is to obtain the Pareto optimal solution by weighting the profit function of the seller and the buyer as the objective function. It is proved that Pareto efficient solutions exist in the cooperative game. Compared with the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game has smaller order quantities, lower retail prices and less marketing costs, and cites cases to be sensitive to the main parameters in the model Sexual analysis.