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本文考察了我国上市公司的高管货币薪酬是否真的存在“奖优不罚劣”的现象。研究发现,在有效控制公司的个体特征后,高管的货币薪酬粘性并不存在;除盈利指标外,我国上市公司在制订高管货币薪酬激励时还考虑到了营运能力、可持续发展能力和偿债能力等其他能反映公司基本面状况的指标。研究结论表明,我国上市公司高管的货币薪酬激励总体上是合理的,近年来被社会普遍关注的高管货币薪酬与经营业绩不匹配的现象并非普遍存在。
This paper examines the phenomenon of whether the executive compensation of listed companies in China really exists or not. The study found that, after the effective control of the individual characteristics of the company, the senior executives do not have the stickiness of the monetary compensation. In addition to the profit indicators, the listed companies in our country also take into account the operational capacity, sustainable development capacity and compensation Debt and other indicators that reflect the company’s fundamentals. The conclusion of the study shows that the monetary compensation incentive of the executives of listed companies in our country is generally reasonable. In recent years, there has been no widespread mismatch between executive compensation and operating performance, which are generally concerned by the society.