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T.库恩的《科学革命的结构》永久性地改变了我们对于科学史的哲学重要性的评价。在反对他所理解的逻辑实证主义者所表述的素朴经验主义的、形式主义的和反历史的科学观的同时,库恩提出了科学变化的另一种观念:科学与其说是由无争议的观察事实的连续积累所推动,莫如说是由深刻的、不连续的概念革命所驱使。在这种革命中,科学思想旧框架的真正基础被根本上是新框架的真正基础所取代。这种革命发生时,我们并不简单地用新的“真
T. Kuhn’s “Structure of Scientific Revolutions” permanently changed our assessment of the philosophical importance of the history of science. In opposition to the naive empiricist, formalist, and anti-historical views of science that his logical positivists express, Kuhn proposes another idea of scientific change: science is not so much a controversial observation as it is Motivated by the continuous accumulation of facts, it is as if driven by a profound, discontinuous conceptual revolution. In this revolution, the true foundation of the old framework of scientific thought is essentially replaced by the true foundation of the new framework. When such a revolution takes place, we do not simply use the new “truth.”