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本文利用逐步回归和路径分析方法 ,检验了我国上市公司CEO薪酬的激励制约机制和激励制约效果。结果发现 :(1)决定CEO薪酬增长的因素主要是营业利润率变动 ,决定CEO薪酬下降的因素则主要是总资产净利率变动 ,这表明在我国上市公司的CEO薪酬层面已体现了一定的激励制约机制 ;(2 )增加CEO薪酬对提高企业的规模和股东财富均有一定的促进作用 ,但降低CEO薪酬却不仅不能提高企业规模和股东财富 ,反而会对其产生一定的负面影响 ,这不仅说明CEO薪酬也具有“工资刚性”特征 ,而且说明我国上市公司的CEO薪酬也仅有单方面的激励效果 ,而没有预期的制约效果 ;(3)无论是增加或降低CEO薪酬 ,CEO均不存在盈余管理或利润操纵的机会主义行为 ,这表明CEO进行盈余管理或利润操纵的动机不应该是为了增加其公开性薪酬 ,而应该是居于除公开性薪酬以外的其他目的。
In this paper, we use the stepwise regression and path analysis methods to test the incentive and restraint mechanisms and incentive and restraint effects of CEO pay in listed companies in China. The results showed that: (1) The factors that determine the CEO's salary growth are mainly the changes of operating profit margin. The factors that determine the CEO's salary decrease are mainly the changes of net assets interest rate, which indicates that certain incentives have been embodied in the CEO remuneration level of listed companies in China (2) Increasing the CEO's remuneration can both promote the scale of the enterprise and the shareholder's wealth, but reducing the CEO's salary can not only increase the size of the enterprise and the shareholder's wealth, but will have a negative impact on it not only Which shows that CEO compensation also has the characteristics of “salary rigidity”, and that the CEO compensation of listed companies in our country also has only one-sided incentive effect without the expected restraint effect. (3) The CEO does not exist either for increasing or decreasing CEO pay Earnings management or profit manipulation opportunistic behavior, which shows that the CEO's motivation for earnings management or profit manipulation should not be to increase its open pay, but should be living in addition to the purpose of public pay for other purposes.