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近年来,封建王朝周期性兴衰问题逐渐成为新制度经济学和历史学研究的热点问题。本文在诺思的暴力潜能理论及奥尔森的国家起源理论基础上,通过理论和模型的分析,可以得到统治者的偏好和有限理性对制度变迁起决定性影响的结论。多数情况下,统治者偏好和有限理性使得统治者在决定制度变迁、制度安排的时候,总是将统治者个人利益置于社会利益之上,以致造成制度的效率损耗或效率低下,而制度的效率又决定着封建王朝经济的发展水平及其周期性兴衰。
In recent years, the periodic rise and fall of the feudal dynasty gradually became a hot issue in the study of new institutional economics and history. Based on North’s theory of violent potential and Olsen’s theory of country origin, this thesis can be concluded through the analysis of theories and models that the preferences and bounded rationality of the rulers play a decisive role in institutional changes. In most cases, the preference and bounded rationality of the rulers make the rulers always put the personal interests of the rulers over the social interests when deciding the institutional changes and institutional arrangements, resulting in the loss of efficiency or inefficiency of the system. However, Efficiency also determines the level of economic development of the feudal dynasty and its cyclical rise and fall.