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经理人股票期权(简称ESO)是现代公司的激励机制之一。它的实质是企业所有者对经营者的一项长期薪酬奖励制度,通过这样一种制度安排,企业经营者的效用与企业股东的效用达到均衡状态,保证企业价值的持续增长。随着我国新《公司法》、《证券法》以及证监会《上市公司期权激励管理办法》的出台,我国股票期权制度的实践将走向一个新的阶段。但中国目前的法律和制度环境依然对经理人股票期权制度的推行和完善构成许多现实障碍。为此,必须进行相应的制度改革。
Executive stock options (referred to as ESO) is one of the incentives of modern companies. Its essence is a long-term remuneration reward system for the operators by the business owner. With such a system arrangement, the utility of the business operators and the utility of the corporate shareholders reach a state of equilibrium so as to ensure the continuous growth of the enterprise value. With the promulgation of new “Company Law”, “Securities Law” and “Administrative Measures on Option Incentives of Listed Companies” in China, the practice of China’s stock option system will move towards a new stage. However, the current legal and institutional environment in China still constitutes a number of practical obstacles to the implementation and improvement of the stock option system for managers. To this end, we must carry out the corresponding system reform.