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本文分析了供应链金融中逆选择和道德风险的产生机理,展示了其简易数学模型。通过对模型的整合和分析,探讨了降低逆选择和道德风险的投机倾向的途径,提出了实践中可以有效解决一部分逆选择和道德风险问题的应对策略:一是通过设计供应链成员间的利益捆绑和风险分担方案;二是政府强制规定建立企业和个人信用档案,加大失信惩罚力度;三是采用物联网加大实时监控力度。
This paper analyzes the mechanism of adverse selection and moral hazard in supply chain finance, and presents its simple mathematical model. Through the integration and analysis of the model, this paper discusses the ways to reduce the speculation propensity of adverse selection and moral hazard and puts forward some countermeasures that can effectively solve some of the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in practice: First, through the design of interests among the members of the supply chain Bundling and risk sharing programs; the second is that the government mandates the establishment of credit records of enterprises and individuals to increase the penalties for misdeeds; third, the use of Internet of Things to increase real-time monitoring.