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本文通过理论分析明确了地方政府税收竞争对税收增长的影响机制.以此为基础,利用我国省际面板数据所做的实证研究显示,地方政府的税收竞争强度每提高0.01,全部税收、中央税收征收额和地方税收征收额分别下降0.64、0.71、0.60个百分点.为了进一步缓解地方政府经济增长激励与维护税法严肃性之间的矛盾,中央政府应逐步提高财产税收入所占的比重,将地方政府的税收竞争主要限制在财产税范围内.“,”Through a simplified theoretical analysis within a compact model,this paper clarifies the impact of local tax competition on revenue growth.Based on the mechanism of the impact,an empirical study by utilizing the interprovincial panel data shows that when tax competition intensity of local government increases 0.01,the total tax revenue,the tax revenue levied by the central government and the tax revenue levied by the local governments decrease respectively at 0.64%,0.71% and 0.60%.In order to relieve the conflict between economic growth incentive of local government and maintaining the seriousness of tax law,central government shall expand the share of property tax progressively and resctrict tax competition among local governments mainly within property tax.