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研究了基于随机过程的有限理性的流域上下游区域水资源利用冲突博弈决策机制.并将博弈人的偏好引入到进化博弈决策机制中,研究了博弈人对策略的偏好程度与进化均衡结果和博弈人行为策略选择之间的关系,只要流域管理机构在制定相关政策时,奖励和惩罚机制设置合理,有限理性的流域上下游群体能够通过不断地学习、调整策略,达到合作治污的结果.,The paper studies the game decision-making mechanism of the bounded rationality watershed upper reaches and lower reaches water resources utilization conflict based on random process. We also make players’ preferences into the decision-making mechanism in the evolutionary game to study the relationship between the strategy preferences and evolution result and the behavior of the players’ strategy choice. So long as the reward and punishment that constituted by valley authority in policies are reasonable, bounded rationality of upper reaches and lower reaches watershed swarms can adjust their strategies by leing, to achieve the results of cooperation in the pollution control.