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早在2005年,松花江案引起了国内学界对环境公益诉讼的关注,同时也引起了对自然物是否应该拥有法律权利的思考。但松花江案的原告代理人并非是想赋予自然物以权利,而仅仅是基于人类中心的视角拯救濒危动物使其不至于灭绝,并且在当今新环保法颁布实施的情况下,思考自然物的法律权利已经不必要了。但真实情况是,在现实层面,新环保法颁布后环境公益诉讼呈现出“叫好不叫座”的尴尬局面;在理论层面,新环保法第五十八条使得其内在的理论无法自洽从而处于一种混乱情况之中。因此,唯一的出路就是赋予自然物包括诉讼资格在内的法律权利,而这一种进路不仅有生态伦理学的理论支持,也在法律层面也是可操作的。
As early as 2005, the case of Songhua River aroused the attention of domestic academic community on environmental public interest litigation, and also raised the question of whether natural things should have legal rights. However, the plaintiff’s agent in the Songhua River case was not trying to give natural things the right but only to save endangered animals from the anthropocentric perspective so that they would not be extinct. In the light of the promulgation and implementation of the new Environmental Protection Law, the legal rights of natural things It is not necessary. However, the truth is that at the practical level, the environmental public interest lawsuit has shown an embarrassing situation of “applauding ” at the promulgation of the new Environmental Protection Law. On the theoretical level, Article 58 of the new Environmental Protection Law makes its internal theory inaccurate Thus in a chaotic situation. Therefore, the only way out is to give the legal rights of natural objects including litigation, and this kind of approach is not only theoretically supported by ecological ethics, but also legal at the operational level.