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麦克道尔哲学的中心课题是消解近现代哲学围绕着心灵与世界的关系而产生的诸多忧虑。麦克道尔进一步将这些忧虑归结为有关心灵事项对世界的指向性或者说其客观意蕴的忧虑。在他看来,这样的忧虑产生的原因根本说来在于两种逻辑空间的截然区分以及近代以来所形成的有关自然的构想。因此,为了消解它们,我们需要重新界定自然观念,使得其也包括第二自然。麦克道尔认为,他有关心灵事项的客观意蕴的观点与维特根斯坦有关思想的可能性的观点如出一辙。本文将梳理麦克道尔的这些思想,指出其对维特根斯坦的相关评论的利用是一种误用。
The central topic of McDougall’s philosophy is to dispel many worries arising from the relationship between the mind and the world in modern philosophy. McDowell further attributes these concerns to concerns that the matter of mind points to the world or its objectivity. In his opinion, the root cause of such worries lies essentially in the sharp distinction between the two logical spaces and in the conception of nature formed in modern times. Therefore, in order to dispel them, we need to redefine the concept of nature so that it also includes the second nature. McDowell held that his view of the objective connotation of the subject of mind was in the same line of opinion as Wittgenstein’s thought. This article examines McDowell’s ideas and points out that their use of Wittgenstein’s comments is a misuse.