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以2008~2013年沪市A股制造业为样本,通过将在职消费划分成正常、超额两部分,研究发现:以薪酬管制、冗员负担为代表的制度背景与上市公司高管超额在职消费显著正相关。并且,高管超额在职消费会显著损害企业绩效,而正常在职消费则能显著提升公司业绩,证明调和在职消费两种理论的关键在于一个合理的“度”。进一步研究发现,当前约束中国上市公司高管攫取超额在职消费的力量主要来自公司内部治理以及外在政治因素,市场化程度的提高并未能产生明显的作用。
Taking the A-share manufacturing industry in Shanghai stock market from 2008 to 2013 as a sample, this study divides the on-the-job consumption into two parts: normal and excess. The research shows that the system background represented by salary control and redundant staff burden is significantly positive Related. Moreover, over-consumption of top-level executives will significantly undermine business performance, while normal on-the-job consumption can significantly improve the performance of the company, proving that the key to reconciling on-the-job consumption lies in a reasonable degree. Further study found that the current restraint executives of Chinese listed companies to grab excessively in-service consumption power comes mainly from the internal governance and external political factors, the improvement of the degree of marketization did not have a significant effect.