论文部分内容阅读
在卖者面对两个风险厌恶的信息不对称知情投标者和一个风险中性的不知情投标者的假设下,研究可分公共物品的拍卖机制设计问题。通过最大化卖者的期望收入,同时满足所有投标者的理性参与约束与知情投标者的激励相容约束,建立了最优机制设计模型;给出了知情投标者的激励相容约束成立的充要条件,并用来简化了卖者的期望收入最大化问题。当不考虑随机性的卖方期望收入最大化问题时,利用Kuhn-Tucker条件进行求解,得到对每个知情投标者都存在一个临界值。当且仅当所报告的估价大于该值时,知情投标者可分配到一定数量拍品;同时,投标者报告的估值越高,就越能获得更多数量的拍品。研究结果对股票或债券发行的机制设计有参考价值,这是因为它们可看做可分的具有公共价值的商品。
Under the assumption that sellers face two risk-averse bidders of information asymmetry and one risk-neutral unsuspecting bidder, the issue of auction mechanism design that can divide public goods is studied. By maximizing the expected revenue of the seller and meeting the constraints of the rational participation of all bidders and the incentive of the informed bidders, an optimal mechanism design model is established. The incentive compatibility constraint of informed bidders To be conditional and to simplify the maximization of the seller’s expected income. When the problem of maximizing revenue expectation of random sellers is not considered, Kuhn-Tucker condition is used to solve the problem. There is a critical value for each informed bidder. Informed bidders may allocate a certain number of lots if and only if the reported value is greater than this value; at the same time, the higher the value as reported by the bidder, the greater the number of lots available. The findings provide a reference for the design of mechanisms for the issuance of stocks or bonds because they can be viewed as separable items of public value.