论文部分内容阅读
目前电力市场中的系统边际价格拍卖与报价价格拍卖都不能有效解决不正当市场竞争引起的电价飞升问题。文中给出了设计抑制电价飞升拍卖机制的原则 ,提出了一种能有效抑制物理持留和经济持留的系统边际价格与报价价格混合拍卖机制。在电价超过高价市场启动价格后 ,根据卖电商是否拥有系统价格权以及报价是否不利于缓解电力供需矛盾 ,执行系统边际价格或报价价格两种电价之一 ,从而加强对卖电商报低电价、减少持留的经济激励 ,可以有效地限制市场势力 ,抑制电价飞升。提出多价格限机制限制强市场势力 ,对不同类卖电商采用不同的价格限 ,使各类卖电商都能获取正当范围内的稀缺租金 ,改善市场结构 ,避免影响发电的长期发展
At present, neither the system marginal price auction nor the quoted price auction in the electricity market can effectively solve the problem of soaring electricity prices caused by unfair market competition. In this paper, the principle of suppressing the soaring auction mechanism of electricity price is given, and a hybrid auction mechanism of system marginal price and offer price that can effectively restrain the physical retention and economic retention is proposed. After the electricity price exceeds the high-priced market start-up price, according to whether the selling electricity supplier has the system price right and whether the quotation is not conducive to ease the power supply and demand contradiction, the implementation of system marginal price or quotation price is one of two kinds of electricity price, , Reducing the retained economic incentives can effectively limit market forces and curb soaring electricity prices. Put forward a multi-price limit mechanism to limit the power of the strong market, apply different price limits to different types of electricity suppliers, enable all kinds of electricity suppliers to obtain scarce rents in their proper scope, improve their market structure and avoid affecting the long-term development of power generation