论文部分内容阅读
我国法院从2002年起开始受理证券虚假陈述民事赔偿案件,是践行投资者保护精神的重大举措。本文运用比较法和经济学,首次对于该制度实行后十年期间的相关案件从数量和质量两方面进行实证研究,发现诉讼提起率远低于预期,但赔付率显著高于国外水平。本文认为,目前我国证券虚假陈述民事赔偿诉讼制度的主要问题不在于实体规则,也不在于诉讼形式,而是法院的司法问题,从而提出以下政策建议:第一,现阶段无须废除诉讼提起的前置条件,但应逐步扩大满足前置条件的处罚类型和范围;第二,目前诉讼形式并无严重问题,尚敷使用,并不亟须引入美国式集团诉讼形式;第三,鉴于法院的地方保护和专业素质等问题,应允许投资者既可在被告公司的所在地起诉,也可在其上市地起诉。
Since 2002, China’s courts have accepted cases of civil compensation for misrepresentation of securities, which is a major measure for practicing the spirit of investor protection. This article uses comparative law and economics for the first time to conduct an empirical study on the quantity and quality of related cases during the ten years after the system was implemented. It finds that the litigation initiation rate is much lower than expected, but the loss payment rate is significantly higher than that of foreign countries. This paper argues that at present the main problem of the civil compensation lawsuit system of China’s securities misrepresentation lies not in substantive rules, nor in the form of litigation, but in the judicial issues of the courts. Therefore, the following policy suggestions are put forward: First, it is not necessary to abolish the Second, at present there is no serious problem in the form of litigation and it is not necessary to introduce the American-style group litigation. Third, given the place of the court Protection and professionalism should allow investors to sue both where the defendant company is located and at the place of listing.