Price decision mechanics of water right trade based on the first-price sealed auction with several r

• 作 者: DENGXiao-hong;ZHONGFang-lei;XUZhong-min;
• 机 构: Laboratory of Watershed Hydrology and Ecology,CAREERI,CAS,Lanzhou 730000 China
• 出 处: 第4届中日韩地理学家学术研讨会暨第12次全国青年地理工作者学术研讨会
• 发表日期: 2009年期

　　Rational water right trade pricing is the key factor of restricting water right trade.This paper worked out a reverse auction and a forward auction considering the different supply-demand relationshipes.Based on the expected utility function,the pricing models of water right trade were set up in terms of the first-price sealed auction with several rounds.It was found that using these auctions the water right can reach to the higher marginal value enterprise from the lower one and bring the efficiency of water right allocating.At the same time,we can obtain that the water right trade pricing become more rational with increasing the number of participants.Considering forward and reverse auctions,this paper also gives two cases for different situations.