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为促使上市公司及时披露年报,证监会实施了定期报告预披露制度。制度实施以来,上市公司年报披露时间明显提前,但是,伴随着年报预披露制度的广泛实施和上市公司对信息披露制度的深入解读,一部分上市公司利用年报预披露制度,隐瞒自己的真实类型,骗取投资。基于信号传递理论,文章认为有好消息的上市公司将预约较早的年报披露时间并按时披露,有坏消息的上市公司可能滥竽充数,预约较早的年报披露时间以获得投资,却延迟披露。实证检验发现规模小的、上市年限较长的、民营的、前十大股东不存在关联关系的上市公司更容易利用年报预披露制度掩饰自己的真实类型,骗取投资。
In order to prompt the listed company to disclose the annual report in time, the CSRC implemented the system of pre-disclosure of regular reports. However, along with the extensive implementation of the pre-disclosure system of annual reports and the in-depth interpretation of information disclosure system by listed companies, some listed companies make use of the pre-disclosure system of annual reports to conceal their true types and cheat investment. Based on the theory of signal transmission, the article thinks that listed companies with good news will appoint an earlier report disclosure time and disclose it on time. Listed companies with bad news may be overcharged, appoint an earlier annual report disclosure time to obtain the investment, but delay the disclosure. Empirical test finds that small listed companies with long time-to-market, privately-owned listed companies that do not have associated relationship among the top ten shareholders are more likely to use the annual report pre-disclosure system to cover up their true type and cheat their investment.