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We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of an upstream manufacturer(M) and a downstream Retailer(R)who transact intermediate products via a wholesale price contract.The supply chain produces and sells an experience good to unit-demand consumers.M,the producer,is liable for the harm caused by its low-quality products.A two-stage game model is built to describe how the supply chain operates: M first chooses a quality level of its product and a wholesale price,followed by Rs ordering decision.In the equilibrium,we find that(1)in spite that product post-sale liability positively affects the wholesale price,Ms quality level,the contracted quantity and the supply chain members profitability are independent of it;(2)in response to changes in liability-related factors,the quality performance criterion is in conflict with the financial performance criterion(in terms of the expected profit)for both M and R,but the quality performance and the financial performance mcrease in quality improvement efficiency;(3) when liability-related factors and Ms quality improvement efficiency change,the wholesale price serves as a medium for M to share its ex ante expected liability cost with R.Managerial insights are also discussed.