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Channel coordination is the optimal state of channel operation, while the problem of how to achieve channel coordination have always been hot issues in marketing channels. In this paper, we first develop channel coordination under the assumption of people’s completely rationality with the introduction of a quantity discount mechanism. Moreover, we relax this relatively strict assumption and consider the situation that manufacturers and retailers may care about not only the self-interest, but also interest of others to determine whether they will be treated fairly compared with each other. Based on this more reasonable assumption, this paper considers mechanism with quantity discounts with the fair preference theory to channel coordination, and we develop a game theory model of the discount channel mechanism based on fair preference. The results show that: as long as the degree of attention with retailers to manufacturers profit and fairness preference coefficients of retailers satisfy certain conditions, coordination could be archived by performing a simple wholesale price and fixed costs. Compared with the Cui et al. (2007), although both research develop mechanisms can achieve channel coordination, there exists different for the allocation ratio of profit when coordination was achieved since the assumptions are different when applied in different places. Cui et al. (2007) believes that allocation ratio of the profit within channels coordination was associated with the parameters of model, however, in this paper we show under the assumption that the profits of retailers equals the profits of independent decision making channels, channel coordination can be achieved.